The Day Care Assignment: A Dynamic Matching Problem
以丹麦为例研究儿童入托的集中分配问题，发现不存在同时满足稳定和策略防伪的机制，并提出一种家长顺序选择学校菜单的机制，兼具策略防伪和帕累托效率。
We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the school choice problem once student mobility is taken into account. We show that there does not exist any mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof. We also show that the well-known Top Trading Cycles mechanism is neither Pareto efficient nor strategy-proof. Finally, a mechanism in which parents sequentially choose menus of schools is both strategy-proof and Pareto efficient.