The differing effects of agent and founder CEOs on the firm's market expansion
研究发现，创始人CEO在任期初期比代理人CEO更积极推动市场扩张，但随后因缺乏行政支持而能力下降，而代理人CEO的市场扩张呈倒U型，且市场复杂性对创始人CEO的约束更强。
Abstract This paper builds and tests the thesis that CEO influence evolves differently for founders and agents. We theorize that at the beginning of their tenures, founder CEOs can pursue market expansion more aggressively than agent CEOs, because they take office with the combination of motivation, power, and requisite knowledge that agent CEOs build over time. Subsequently, however, founder CEOs have less access to the administrative infrastructure necessary to sustain a growing firm, making them less able than agent CEOs to continue market expansion mid‐tenure and more severely constrained by market complexity. A longitudinal study of cable television operators confirms that the firm's market expansion follows an inverted U‐shape for agents and a downward slope for founders, while market complexity reduces market expansion, especially for founders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.