Family Altruism and Incentives
研究了在子女努力内生且父母对子女收入信息不完全时，利他主义家庭中的代际转移模式，发现若父母能可信承诺，则对子女坏结果的补偿少于标准模型，且李嘉图等价在非负约束不紧时成立。
Abstract This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding.