Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration
利用当代国际卡特尔数据集，估计组织特征、宏观经济波动和行业结构对卡特尔持续时间的影响，发现1995年后反垄断执法显著增加卡特尔解体风险，补偿方案降低解体概率，而报复性惩罚则增加自然死亡风险。
We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary international cartels. We estimate a proportional hazards model with competing risks, distinguishing factors that increase the risk of “death by antitrust” from those that affect natural death, including defection, dissension, and entry. Our analysis indicates that the probability of cartel death from any cause increased significantly after 1995, when competition authorities expanded enforcement efforts toward international cartels. We find that fluctuations in firm-specific discount rates have a significant effect on cartel duration, whereas market interest rates do not. Cartels with a compensation scheme—a plan for how the cartel will handle variations in demand—are significantly less likely to break up. In contrast, retaliatory punishments in response to perceived cheating significantly increase the likelihood of natural death. Cartels that have to punish are not stable cartels.