Monopolistic Competition with Experience Goods
构建了一个垄断竞争模型，消费者在首次购买前无法直接验证产品质量，而是通过观察价格来推断质量。研究发现均衡质量低于有效水平，但不会降到最低；自由进入时产品种类多于完全信息情形。
This paper constructs a model of monopolistic competition where consumers cannot directly verify product quality prior to an initial purchase. Instead, consumers base initial purchases on observed prices, which perfectly signal firms' qualities both in and out of equilibrium. Equilibrium quality is less than efficient, but generally bounded away from the minimum quality. With free entry, observable product variety exceeds what would prevail with perfect information. As repeat purchases become large relative to initial purchases, or as firms become small relative to the size of the market, equilibrium product quality rises, and the market converges to the full information equilibrium.