Voting on Majority Rules
用代际交叠模型分析改革项目的投票，发现老年人因受益期短或税负高而更保守，且当人们投票决定未来所需多数规则时，胜出的方案总是要求绝对多数。
We analyse an overlapping generations model of voting on "reform projects". These resemble investments in that they first require some investment expenditure and later payoff. Since the time during which old people get the benefit is shorter, or because older people are more wealthy and hence pay more taxes, they are more conservative (against reforms) than young people.We show that if people vote on which majority should be required in future elections for a bill to become a law, the winning proposal specifies a supermajority. This result is very robust even if age related conflict is only one determinant among others for voting behaviour in the society. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.