Employment Efficiency and Sticky Wages: Evidence from Flows in the Labor Market
比较了劳动力市场的三种观点，发现工资粘性下就业治理有效的观点最符合数据：美国经济衰退并非始于裁员潮，失业上升是因为找工作困难而非被解雇人数异常增加。
I consider three views of the labor market. In the first, wages are flexible and employment follows the principle of bilateral efficiency. Workers never lose their jobs because of sticky wages. In the second, wages are sticky and inefficient layoffs do occur. In the third, wages are also sticky, but employment governance is efficient. I show that the behavior of flows in the labor market strongly favors the third view. In the modern U.S. economy, recessions do not begin with a burst of layoffs. Unemployment rises because jobs are hard to find, not because an unusual number of people are thrown into unemployment. 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.