SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES IN GAMES: AN APPLICATION TO THE OVERBIDDING PUZZLE*
通过实验证明，在一级价格拍卖中，参与者低估自己获胜概率是导致过度出价的主要原因，而风险厌恶的作用比以往认为的小；提供预测精度反馈能减少过度出价。
This article illustrates how the joint elicitation of subjective probabilities and preferences may help us understand behavior in games. We conduct an experiment to test whether biased probabilistic beliefs may explain overbidding in first‐price auctions. The experimental outcomes indicate that subjects underestimate their probability of winning the auction, and indeed overbid. When provided with feedback on the precision of their predictions, subjects learn to make better predictions, and to curb significantly overbidding. The structural estimation of different behavioral models suggests that biased probabilistic beliefs are a driving force behind overbidding, and that risk aversion plays a lesser role than previously believed.