Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment
研究在多边谈判中，卖家进行伯特兰竞争时，即使声誉和摩擦消失，垄断价格和零价格仍可成为均衡结果，表明战略承诺和声誉会影响议价能力。
This paper shows that in a multilateral bargaining setting where the sellers compete á la Bertrand, a range of prices that includes the monopoly price and 0 are compatible with equilibrium, even in the limit where the reputational concerns and frictions vanish. In particular, the incentive of committing to a specific demand, the opportunity of building reputation about inflexibility, and the anxiety of preserving their reputation can tilt players' bargaining power in such a way that being deemed as a tough bargainer is bad for the competing players, and thus, price undercutting is not optimal for the sellers.