Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
研究双边匹配问题，其中每个人只将对方视为可接受或不可接受，利用随机化设计出高效且公平的匹配机制，并证明等概率获得可接受伴侣的机制具有洛伦兹优势和群体策略证明性。
<br>We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate; all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical.</br> <br>Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants is a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate across all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market.</br>