An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints
分析制造商对零售商施加价格、地点和销售限制的理论基础，识别三种外部性导致统一价格合同无法协调零售商激励，并找出在不同条件下能消除外部性、实现联合利润最大化的纵向限制组合。
Vertical restraints imposed by manufacturers on the prices, locations, and sales of retail firms represent a puzzling departure from the simple price-mediated exchange of conventional markets. In this article we analyze the theoretical basis for these restraints. In a setting where retailers inform consumers and are imperfectly competitive, and where a manufacturer has some monopoly power, we identify three potential externalities affecting retailers' decisions. These externalities lead to the failure of simple uniform-price contracts to coordinate the incentives of retailers with the objective of maximizing combined manufacturer and retailer profits. We identify the packages of vertical restraints that are minimally sufficient, under various conditions, to neutralize the externalities and to achieve the joint-profit maximum.