Information Sharing in Credit Markets
构建了一个逆向选择模型，分析放贷人之间信息共享的内生动机，发现借款人流动性和异质性、市场规模及信息技术进步会促进信息共享，而竞争恐惧则抑制它；信息共享在逆向选择严重时能增加贷款量。
ABSTRACT We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.