International Macroeconomic Policy Coordination When Policymakers Do Not Agree on the True Model.
研究政策制定者不确定真实模型时国际政策协调的效果，发现协调虽能达成合作，但可能使目标变量偏离正确方向，基于十种计量模型模拟显示货币协调仅半数情况改善美国福利。
The authors relax the assumption of the literature on international coordination that policymakers know the true model. T wo countries will still be able to agree on a cooperative policy pack age that each believes will improve the objective function relative t o the Nash noncooperative solution. However, the bargaining solution may move the target variables in the wrong direction. These points ar e illustrated with monetary and fiscal multipliers taken from simulat ions of ten leading econometric models. Out of 1,000 possible combina tions of models that could represent U.S. beliefs, non-U.S. beliefs, and the true model, monetary coordination improves U.S. welfare in on ly 546 cases. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.