PARALLEL TRADE, INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A WELFARE ANALYSIS*
分析了平行贸易（套利）对知识产权保护产品的影响，发现需求分散度不高时平行贸易改善事后配置，但会因投资减少降低事前产品质量，且仿制品的存在显著影响福利效应。
This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. We discuss a basic trade‐off that arises between the ex post better allocation that typically occurs under parallel trade when demand dispersion is not too high, and the ex ante reduced product quality because of lower investment. We show that the size of the welfare effects is significantly affected by the presence of a ‘generic’ product, which represents a form of competition for the monopolist. The monopolist will introduce a ‘fighting brand’ to compete with the generic, which dilutes but does not eliminate the result on the adverse effects of parallel trade on investments.