EXCHANGEABLE DEBT CALLS AND SECURITY RETURNS
研究发现，可交换债券赎回公告不会导致发行公司股东异常损失，但会减少目标公司股东财富，可能因为所有权分散降低了被收购概率。
Exchangeable calls are not convertible into the calling firm's common stock but into the common stock of a target firm in which the calling firm has an ownership position. In addition to reducing leverage, exchangeables change the asset composition of the calling firm through the divestiture of the calling firm's ownership stake in the target firm. In contrast to the evidence on convertible calls, our findings indicate that announcements of exchangeable debt calls are not associated with an abnormal capital loss for the calling firm shareholders. For target firms, announcements of exchangeable calls reduce shareholder wealth. A lower probability of takeover resulting from diffusion of ownership concentration of the target firm's common stock may contribute to this result.