On the Stewardship and Valuation Implications of Accrual Accounting Systems
研究了权责发生制会计中激进或保守策略如何影响盈余质量，发现这些策略可委托给管理层，并探讨了其对价格-盈余回归等实证指标的影响。
In this paper we explore the role of accruals in determining “earnings quality” from both a stewardship and a valuation perspective. We show that the valuation and stewardship qualities of accrual accounting are maximized by either an “aggressive” or a “conservative” accrual strategy. Furthermore, accrual strategy choices can be delegated to management as it does not benefit by implementing a strategy that is not in the best interests of the shareholders. We also investigate the implications of accrual strategies for standard empirical measures of “earnings quality”: regression coefficients and R-squares from price-earnings and market-to-book regressions. We show that such measures respond differently, and in some cases adversely, to the kind of strategies that make accounting constructs more correlated with the underlying economic activities of firms.