A Welfare Analysis of Employment Contracts with and without Asymmetric Information
刻画了工人事后不可流动时雇佣合同的福利经济学，推导了约束帕累托最优的充要条件，比较了对称与不对称信息、灵活与刚性合同下的福利影响，并识别了不对称信息特有的外部性。
This paper provides a complete characterization of the welfare economics of employment contracts when workers are immobile in the ex post period. Necessary and sufficient conditions for constrained Pareto optimality are derived for economies with incomplete risk markets, two consumption goods and random production technologies in which: (a) workers can/cannot observe realizations of their employers' revenue function (symmetric vs. asymmetric information), and in which; (b) employment contracts allow/preclude contingent wages and/or employment levels (flexible vs. rigid contracts). This taxonomic approach serves to identify the welfare implications of exogenous and endogenous contractual rigidities, and to isolate a class of externalities that is unique to economies with asymmetric information. The latter market failure is also present with "indexed" contracts when workers alone can observe realizations of their consumption goods prices (another form of asymmetric information).