Insider Trading and the Value of the Firm
通过两阶段测试方法，纠正了盈利、内部持股与内幕交易之间的同时性偏差，发现内幕交易会降低公司边际价值，而高管持股则提升公司价值。
Previous studies of insider trading have examined the profitability to executives of their stock trading with a view to evaluating the informational efficiency of securities markets. The authors examine empirically whether insider trading raises or lowers firm value. To correctly identify the effects on firm value at the margin, they correct for the simultaneity of earnings, insider holdings, and the amount of insider trading. The authors explicitly deal with simultaneity by using a two-part testing procedure. Their results suggest that insider trading lowers the value of the firm at the margin, but that greater executive stock ownership raises the value. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.