Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in Northern Nigeria
研究尼日利亚北部农村信贷合同中如何通过还款条件来分担风险，发现贷款中隐含了重要的状态依存支付，但未达到完全有效的风险分担均衡。
Credit contracts play a direct role in pooling risk between households in northern Nigeria. Repayments owed by borrowers depend on realizations of random shocks by both borrowers and lenders. The paper develops two models of state-contingent loans. The first is a competitive equilibrium in perfectly enforceable contracts. The second permits imperfect information and equilibrium default. Estimates of both models indicate that quantitatively important state-contingent payments are embedded in these loan transactions, but that a fully efficient risk-pooling equilibrium is not achieved. The research is based on a year-long survey in Zaria, Nigeria conducted by the author.