The Economist in Tort Litigation
探讨经济学家在民事侵权诉讼中担任顾问和专家证人迅速增多的现象，分析利益冲突问题，认为尽管存在压力但证据显示不道德行为并不普遍，并讨论了市场、司法和伦理准则等不完善的保障机制。
In recent decades, the involvement of economists as consultants and expert witnesses in civil tort actions has grown rapidly. In this article, the authors discuss the reasons for this phenomenon and the extent to conflicts of interest to arise in the practice of what is frequently called ‘forensic economics.’ They argue that, although conflict-of-interest pressures exist, the limited evidence does not indicate that unethical practices are rampant within the profession. Moreover, market correctives, judicial screening, codes of ethical behavior, and the dissemination of knowledge concerning proper forensic practice help to serve as (arguably imperfect) safeguards against unethical practice.