Investment Incentives: New Money, Debt Relief, and the Critical Role of Conditionality in the Debt Crisis
研究了债务危机爆发后，债务人与债权人之间修订合同的可能方案，分析了新资金和债务减免的不同组合对债务国福利、偿债和债权人收益的影响，并区分了能否可信承诺调整计划的国家，讨论了国际金融机构条件性贷款的作用。
External debt depresses investment and lowers economic growth below its potential through its negative effect on liquidity and expected profitability. These effects can pull a country into a downward spiral in which both the debtor country and creditors lose. This article considers the possibilities for revising contracts between a debtor and its creditors once a debt crisis has erupted. The framework that we develop shows how various combinations of new money and cuts in debt and debt service affect a debtor country's welfare, its debt repayments, and the earnings of its creditors. The analysis distinguishes between debtor countries that are willing and able to precommit credibly to an adjustment program and those that are not. This distinction provides the basis for a discussion of conditional lending by the international financial institutions to provide incentives and sanctions that make credible a debtor's promises to invest.