Credit Market Consequences of Improved Personal Identification: Field Experimental Evidence from Malawi
通过在马拉维的随机田野实验，研究发现对借款人进行指纹识别提高了高违约风险借款人的还款率，但对其他借款人无显著影响，且伴随逆向选择和道德风险降低的行为证据。
We implemented a randomized field experiment in Malawi examining borrower responses to being fingerprinted when applying for loans. This intervention improved the lender's ability to implement dynamic repayment incentives, allowing it to withhold future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. As predicted by a simple model, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. We provide unique evidence that this improvement in repayment rates is accompanied by behaviors consistent with less adverse selection and lower moral hazard.