Asymmetric Tournaments, Equal Opportunity Laws, and Affirmative Action: Some Experimental Results
通过实验评估平权行动和平等机会法对经济主体产出的影响，发现两者均有利于弱势群体，平等机会法还能提高所有参与者的努力水平，而平权行动的效果取决于弱势群体的成本劣势程度。
This paper assesses whether affirmative action programs and equal opportunity laws affect the output of economic agents. More precisely, we find that equal opportunity laws and affirmative action programs always benefit disadvantaged groups. Equal opportunity laws also increase the effort levels of all subjects and hence the profits of the tournament administrator (usually the firm). The effects of affirmative action programs depend on the severity of a group's cost disadvantage. When the cost disadvantage is severe, these programs significantly increase effort levels (and hence profits). The opposite is true when the disadvantage is slight.