Credible discovery, settlement, and negative expected value suits
在信息不对称下将证据开示引入和解与负预期价值诉讼模型，发现证据开示因成本低于诉讼而降低被告和解意愿，且其可信性约束进一步减少和解概率与金额，并削弱原告利用信息不对称获取高额和解的能力。
We introduce discovery into a model of settlement and negative expected value (NEV) suits under asymmetric information. The option to conduct discovery has several important effects. First, because discovery is cheaper than litigation, it reduces the defendant's incentive to settle under asymmetric information. Second, discovery must be credible. Because discovery is more valuable the greater the uncertainty it resolves, this introduces a credibility constraint on pre‐discovery settlement offers. This can further reduce the probability and size of a defendant's pre‐discovery settlement offer. Lastly, discovery reduces the ability of NEV plaintiffs to use asymmetric information to extract significant settlements from defendants.