Protection Against a Capricious State: French Investment and Spanish Railroads, 1845–1875
研究19世纪中期西班牙铁路建设中的超额利润，认为这是对西班牙国家缺乏信誉的回应，并通过财务关联和利润估算首次记录了这些超额利润。
Infrastructure construction is often associated with excessive, even corrupt, profits. This article argues that construction profits earned in Spanish railroads in the mid-nineteenth century were a response to the lack of credibility of the Spanish state. It also makes the first attempt to document excess construction profits in Spanish railroads by demonstrating, for example, financial links between railroad stockholders and the providers of construction goods and services and by directly estimating construction profits. The estimated excess construction profits only provided railroad entrepreneurs with a normal rate of return to their entire railroad-related investments.