Signal Jamming in New Credit Markets
构建了一个两期模型，分析贷款机构在新市场中的信贷操作如何外化借款人还款能力信息，从而影响外部竞争者的进入策略，并识别出内部贷款机构通过扭曲信息流来维持竞争优势的均衡策略。
This paper develops a simple two-period model in which a lender's credit operations in a new market end up externalizing information on borrowers' repayment capabilities. This information improves the competitive position of outside lenders by allowing them to enter the credit market with a more accurate description of potential clients. Equilibrium strategies are then identified where an inside lender chooses to offer a costly first-period contract with the explicit objective of distorting the quality of the external information flow in the second period.