Innovation, Firm Size and Growth in a Centralized Organization
研究集中控制的企业中，企业家如何分配注意力评估现有项目或新项目，推导出最优创新、企业规模和增长，发现创新率不仅取决于垄断利润、企业规模和技术机会，还取决于过时概率。
The optimal innovation, firm size, and growth are derived for a centrally controlled firm in which only the entrepreneur evaluates and restores current projects or evaluates and adopts new projects. Current projects are subject to failure (due to entry) and possible obsolescence, while new projects may not be successful. The optimal allocation of attention implies bounds on firm size and that the rate of innovation depends not only on monopoly profits, firm size, and technological opportunity, but also on the probability of obsolescence. The effects of monopoly power and firm size on innovation also depend on the degree of obsolescence.