The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness
从法律经济学角度分析经济专家证人的使用，回应了关于专家偏袒、证词可理解性及专家相互抵消的担忧，并提出改进建议，如更多采用仲裁模式下的法院指定专家。
I will consider the law and economics of the use of economic expert witnesses. After introducing the law governing the use of expert witnesses (including economists), I analyze and respond to several concerns regarding the use of expert witnesses. The first is that expert witnesses paid by the respective parties are bound to be partisans ("hired guns") rather than being disinterested, and hence presumptively truthful, or at least honest, witnesses. A second concern is about intelligibility once the expert's evidence has been admitted. A third concern about expert testimony is that opposing experts often cancel each other out. Supposing that the use of economists' testifying as expert witnesses is here to stay, we should consider how the system might be improved. My major proposal is the greater use of court-appointed experts selected on the arbitration model, but I have two additional proposals.