Extrinsic versus intrinsic problems of agricultural cooperation: Anti‐incentivism in Tanzania and China
研究了坦桑尼亚和中国集体农业失败的原因，指出缺乏地方自主、参与控制、合理激励和外部灵活性是关键，反激励主义、官僚控制和外部掠夺环境是主要障碍。
Abstract Peasant willingness to engage in collective farming, and the efficiency of collective farms once established, may be preconditioned on local self‐determination, participatory control, discriminating work incentives, and external manoeuvrability. In the absence of such preconditions, whether or not there exist economies of scale sufficient to offset effectively minimised incentive problems cannot be determined. 'Anti‐incentivism', bureaucratic controls, and extractive external environments are identified as factors inhibiting successful collective farming in both Tanzania and China. Explanations of these tendencies in the two countries are sought in their political economies and ideological structures. Notes Associate Professor of Economics, Brown University. This work has been facilitated by support from the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China, the American Council of Learned Societies, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Parts of the research were undertaken while the author was a visiting fellow at the Centre for Chinese Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford, and at the Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University. I have benefited from the comments of participants at the development economics workshop at the University of Toronto and the interuniversity faculty research seminar of the Center for the Comparative Study of Development at Brown University. I would also like to adknowledge helpful conversations and correspondence with Mark Blecher, Keith Griffin, Richard Palmer‐Jones, Nicholas Lardy, Cyril Lin, Neville Maxwell, Barry Naughton, Victor Nee, Peter Nolan, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, Mark Selden and Wu Jing‐lian. None of these bears any responsibility for the ideas expressed here.