Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
刻画了偏好相同的玩家在重复协调博弈中的最优策略，表明最优性可与子博弈完美均衡相容，并分析了玩家如何利用先例作为焦点实现并维持协调。
This paper proposes a characterization of optimal strategies for playing certain repeated coordination games whose players have identical preferences. Players' optimal coordination strategies reflect their uncertainty about how their partners will respond to multiple-equilibrium problems; this uncertainty constrains the statistical relationships between their strategy choices players can bring about. The authors show that optimality is nevertheless consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium. Examples are analyzed in which players use precedents as focal points to achieve and maintain coordination, and in which they play dominated strategies with positive probability in early stages in the hope of generating a useful precedent. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.