Equilibrium Income Inequality among Identical Agents
提出一个理论，解释即使个体偏好和天赋相同，收入不平等仍会存在并持续。模型假设无技能劳动力由受过教育的经理监督，且代理人无法借贷投资人力资本，导致均衡中出现收入分配不均、教育补贴代际传递等现象。
The paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents. Teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale. Agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers. Despite ex ante identical agents, the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena: (1) risk-averse agents accept fair gambles, implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income; (2) agents agree to publicly subsidize education, although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth; and (3) incomes and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.