Assignment Messages and Exchanges
提出“分配消息”作为通过线性规划描述可替代偏好的通用消息形式，证明整数分配消息下存在整数瓦尔拉斯配置，并说明分配消息在机制设计中的其他应用。
“Assignment messages” are maximally general messages to describe substitutable preferences by means of a linear program. With “integer assignment messages,” there exist integer-valued Walrasian allocations, extending a result of Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1971). Any pure Nash equilibrium profile of the Walrasian mechanism with participants limited to assignment messages is also a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted Walrasian mechanism. Assignment exchanges are generalizations of single-product double auctions and are related to ascending multi-product clock auctions and the Vickrey mechanism. Assignment messages also have additional applications in mechanism design.