DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER
研究两家在位卖方和潜在进入者在产能约束下如何选择产能和定价，买方为保持竞争会分散订单，使高价和低价卖方都能售出，买方通过承诺不购或雇佣代理人可获益。
We analyze a simple dynamic durable good model. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition, making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller. A buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller.