Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
用线性供给函数模型分析了三种增加英格兰和威尔士电力现货市场竞争的政策效果，发现部分剥离能大幅减少无谓损失，拆分主导企业效果更佳但政治不可行，而提前鼓励进入可能降低福利。
This paper models the effect of three policies that could increase the amount of competition in the electricity spot market in England and Wales. It uses a linear supply function model with asymmetric firms. The paper finds that the regulator's chosen policy, partial divestiture, should lead to a substantial reduction in deadweight losses. Splitting up the dominant firms would have more effect but is unlikely to be politically feasible, while encouraging competitive entry 'in advance of need' would tend to reduce welfare. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.