THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.
基于西班牙报纸27年数据，研究发现当企业所有者与高管有家族关系时，公司业绩和商业风险对CEO任期的影响更强，且解雇家族CEO后组织结果更有利。
Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.