What Is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association, 1935–2004
利用美国经济学会选举数据，通过新计量方法发现女性候选人胜率远高于随机水平，这可能是反向歧视或反映女性更高生产力，但无法确定歧视的方向或程度。
We illustrate problems of measuring discrimination using elections to AEA offices. With a new econometric technique, we find female candidates have a much better than random chance of victory. This advantage is either reverse discrimination or reflects beliefs that women are more productive. The former interpretation could be explained by an unchanging median voter whose preferences were not satisfied by suppliers of candidates; but there was a structural change in voting behavior in the mid-1970s. The results suggest it is generally impossible to claim differences in rewards, for different groups measure the extent of discrimination or even its direction.