Bargaining and the Joint-Cost Theory of Strikes: An Experimental Study
通过实验检验完全信息博弈中罢工频率的预测，基于“联合成本”理论设计“缩小的馅饼”游戏，发现罢工频繁且不随时间消失，该理论得到部分支持。
This article reports on an experiment that is designed to test predictions about the frequency of disagreement (strikes) in games with complete information. An empirical test of the "joint-cost" theory, which relates strike activity to the marginal cost of striking, is based on a set of "shrinking pie" games in which subjects bargain in consecutive periods over how to divide a sum of money. Strike activity is a frequent occurrence in these games and, moreover, does not disappear over time. The joint-cost theory receive some support, indicating that further tests may be useful. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.