Internal control system, earnings quality, and the dynamics of financial reporting
构建了一个盈余管理模型，其中经理人在企业控制系统失效时操纵信息，并基于积分精度概念提出具有理论基础的盈余质量度量方法，揭示了误报频率与幅度之间的权衡关系。
Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm’s control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade‐off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a structural method to identify the likelihood and magnitude of misreporting by exploiting information from the moments of the distribution of reported earnings.