Deregulation and the adaptation of governance structure: the case of the U.S. airline industry
利用1978年美国航空放松管制法案前后的22年数据，研究航空业治理结构（股权集中度、CEO薪酬、期权授予、董事会规模）如何适应环境变化，发现放松管制后治理结构向非管制企业靠拢，但适应过程缓慢，且治理结构与公司生存相关。
Deregulation provides a natural experiment for examining how governance adapts to structural changes in the business environment. We investigate the evolution of governance structure, characterized by ownership concentration, compensation policy, and board composition, in the U.S. airline industry during a 22-year period surrounding the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. Consistent with theory, we find that after deregulation (i) equity ownership is more concentrated, (ii) CEO pay increases, (iii) stock option grants to CEOs increase, and (iv) board size decreases. Airlines' governance structures gravitate toward the system of governance mechanisms used by unregulated firms. The adaptation process is gradual, however, suggesting that it is costly to alter organizational capital. We also present evidence on the relation between governance structure and firm survival.