The Politics of Infrastructure
研究了美国各州公共基础设施支出的政治制度与决策过程，发现任期限制、公民倡议和预算程序等制度显著影响公共资本存量和新投资流量，立法稳定性和选民波动性也与基础设施差异相关。
A number of recent studies attempt to measure the productivity of public capital. Some estimates indicate that government investments are a potential well-spring for economic progress, while others indicate that public infrastructure has a negligible effect on private sector output. This article investigates political institutions and processes underlying the decisions for public infrastructure spending. We apply the framework of strategic models of fiscal policy and develop an empirical model to analyze the substantial differences in public capital across American states. Institutions such as term limits, citizen initiative, and budgeting procedures were significant determinants of state public capital stocks and the flow of new public investments during the 1980s. The results further suggest that political conditions such as legislative stability and voter volatility are systematically related to infrastructure differences across states.