利润最大化与代理问题:英国企业慈善捐赠分析

Profit maximisation vs. agency: an analysis of charitable giving by UK firms

Cambridge Journal of Economics · 2005
被引 43
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

分析了英国上市公司慈善捐赠的动机,发现企业规模和广告强度增加捐赠参与概率,而严格的公司治理和高管薪酬降低参与概率;捐赠金额则与研发强度、高管薪酬和盈利能力正相关,与负债率负相关。

Abstract

The charitable giving of a large sample of publicly quoted UK firms is analysed within a model that explores the profit maximisation and managerial utility enhancement motives for giving. The empirical method draws a distinction between the decision to participate in giving and the determination of the amount of corporate contributions. Firm size and advertising intensity are found to be positively associated with the probability of participation in giving. Stricter corporate governance and the rate of directors' remuneration are negatively related to the probability of participation. Among givers, the rate of giving is related positively to R&D intensity, the rate of directors' remuneration, and corporate profitability and negatively to firm indebtedness. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

企业慈善捐赠利润最大化代理理论公司治理