It Takes t ∗ to Tango: Trading Coalitions with Fixed Prices
研究Edgeworth非试探过程中，在固定价格下需要多大联盟才能实现帕累托改进交易，发现当部分代理人未持有所有商品时，联盟形成所需信息量可能非常大。
In the Edgeworth non-tâtonnement process, trade occurs if there exists some coalition of agents able to make a Pareto-improving trade among themselves at current prices. It is known that the coalition size required is bounded by the number of commodities and that, provided all agents always have strictly positive endowments, bilateral trade suffices. These results are generalized, but it is shown that, when some agents do not hold all commodities, the information requirements for coalition formation can be very severe. Coalition size is not the only problem; very detailed information on preferences may be needed.