"Rational" Duopoly Equilibria
研究双寡头模型中企业猜测对手产量反应的情形，发现静态下存在大量“理性”均衡，但理性只能是一方的；动态模型同样面临解过多的问题。
This paper examines duopoly models in which each firm tries to guess the reaction of its rival to a change in its output. We seek equilibria in which the guesses are accurate, or "rational." For static models we discover that many output combinations (X, Y) can fit into such equilibria and that our concept of "rationality" must necessarily be one-sided: if a firm has accurate expectations at (X, Y) about its rival's reactions, the competitor's reactions cannot themselves be based on "rational" calculations. Turning to a dynamic model, we find that an oversupply of solution pairs continues to be a problem.