Incentives for Monitoring Quality
分析采购中产品质量可被买卖双方观察但不可验证时，双方福利低于可验证情况，且即使买方拥有全部议价权，供应商也能获益，说明双方在质量可验证性上利益一致。
We analyze a procurement problem in which the quality of the delivered product can be observed perfectly by the buyer and supplier, but may not be verifiable, i.e., may not be observable to any third party. We present a set of plausible conditions under which the equilibrium welfare of both the buyer and supplier is higher when quality is verifiable than when it is unverifiable. The welfare gain for the privately informed supplier arises even when the buyer has all the bargaining power. Thus, the interests of the buyer and supplier coincide with regard to whether delivered quality should be made verifiable.