Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting
假设变量可验证的概率是内生的，由委托人投资于起草明确合同决定，分析这种设定下委托代理关系，并展示重复互动建立的信任与法院如何导致合同不完全。
Principal-agent models usually invoke the strong assumption that the parties know for sure ex ante whether a variable is verifiable or not. This paper assumes that only the probability of verification is known, and that this probability is endogenously determined. We analyze a principal-agent relationship where the verifiability of the agent's output is determined by the principal's investment in drafting an explicit contract. The model is well suited for analyzing the relationship between explicit contracting, legal courts, trust, and relational contracting. In particular, we show how trust—established through repeated interaction—and legal courts may induce contractual incompleteness.