De Jure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?
回顾跨州银行业务限制的历史，分析1994年《跨州银行与分行效率法》的条款，并构建游说压力模型解释金融监管法规的变迁，指出事实上的自由化先于法定自由化。
This paper tackles three tasks. It reviews the history of restrictions on interstate banking. It summarizes the provisions of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, underscoring the opt-in and opt-out lobbying pressure this act assigns to state legislatures. Finally, the paper develops a lobbying-pressure model designed to explain statutory changes in the framework of financial regulation. The model implies that de facto liberalization of a regulatory regime precedes its de jure liberalization. Once adopted, statutory restrictions on banks remain in place until technology and competitive regulatory enforcement have fashioned loopholes wide enough to reverse the statute-sponsoring balance of lobbying pressure. Copyright 1996 by Ohio State University Press.