A Simple Model of Commodity Taxation and Cross‐border Shopping
建立两个国家因跨境购物而进行商品税竞争的简单模型，分析非合作税收均衡及协调方案，发现运输成本下边境卖家利润征税可能降低税收，边境检查反而可能增加跨境购物量。
This paper sets up a simple model in which two countries, differing in geographical extent, engage in commodity tax competition originating in opportunities for cross‐border shopping. The non‐cooperative tax equilibrium and various coordination initiatives are examined in the benchmark model and in two model extensions incorporating (i) costs of transportation for goods and (ii) border inspection. Among the more surprising results are the following: with (i), pure profits accrue to sellers near the border, but subjecting them to tax may lower the country's total tax revenue; with (ii), the volume of cross‐border shopping may well increase.