The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition Revisited
指出关于竞争加剧导致银行风险上升的文献对监管者影响很大，但实证证据好坏参半，且现有理论分析存在相反的风险激励效应，即市场集中度提高反而使银行更冒险。
ABSTRACT There is a large body of literature that concludes that—when confronted with increased competition—banks rationally choose more risky portfolios. We argue that this literature has had a significant influence on regulators and central bankers. We review the empirical literature and conclude that the evidence is best described as “mixed.” We then show that existing theoretical analyses of this topic are fragile, since there exist fundamental risk‐incentive mechanisms that operate in exactly the opposite direction, causing banks to become more risky as their markets become more concentrated. These mechanisms should be essential ingredients of models of bank competition.