Information Exchange and Strategic Behavior in Supply Chains: Application to the Food Sector
基于食品行业证据，用博弈论分析不确定性下零售商与供应商的信息交换策略，发现零售商可能隐瞒销售数据，但存在均衡使供应商仍能获取信息，且市场力量强的零售商更愿分享信息。
Abstract Information technology (IT) facilitates information exchange between retailers and suppliers. Based on evidence from food industry, information strategies under uncertainty are analyzed, using game theory. Some key results are under certain conditions, retailers withhold valuable sales data from suppliers even if this means less supply coordination; a revealed equilibrium exists where suppliers learn retailers' market data despite retailers' withholding of such data; this leads either to full information convergence or, surprisingly, incomplete information convergence with some informational asymmetry left; retailers with greater market power and numerous suppliers are more inclined to share, rather than to withhold, information.