Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting
分析满足内部一致性标准的再谈判证明均衡集，研究贴现趋近于零时这些集合的极限点，发现极限集要么是单点集，要么属于阶段博弈可行支付凸包的帕累托前沿。
Recent literature in the theory of games addresses the criticism that efficient outcomes in a dynamic game are often supported by punishment paths that do not have the same efficiency property. The outcome of this research is the notion of renegotiation-proof equilibria. In this paper, I analyze the notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium sets that satisfy a natural criterion of internal consistency, one that the earlier notions do not satisfy. I analyze the limit points of such sets as discounting vanishes. The main result states that such limit sets must either be singletons or belong to the Pareto frontier of the convex hull of the feasible set of stage game payoffs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 026.